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Abstract:    
 
Affordable homeownership is a policy that is often accorded a great deal of policy 
attention by governments of many countries.  In this paper, we examine the market 
implications of setting a housing price to income ratio target for a market segment by the 
government.  The policy requires active intervention by the government with regard to 
the targeted sector.  We use a simple model of the housing market with a homeownership 
affordability target to derive the market implications of such targets. In the presence of 
uncertainty and resource constraints, the objective of homeownership affordability is 
achieved for the targeted group at the expense of greater volatility in residential 
construction activity.  When the size of the targeted sector is significant in size, there are 
spillover price and crowding out effects on the non-targeted housing market segment.  
This results in political pressure on the government to expand homeownership 
affordability targets to increasing segments of the population.  Housing price to income 
ratios tend to be fairly constant over time and across targeted groups, the housing supply 
is relatively price inelastic and the income elasticity of housing demand is less than one. 
The Singapore government intervenes extensively in the housing sector to ensure 
homeownership affordability, with a resulting homeownership rate of 91 percent for the 
resident population.  The above hypotheses regarding the implications of setting housing 
price to income ratio targets are tested using the Singapore housing market.  The 
experience and data for Singapore were found to support the above hypotheses. 
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Introduction:  homeownership as policy objective 
 
The promotion of homeownership is often accorded a great deal of policy 
attention by governments of many countries.  The benefits as well as the costs of home 
ownership have been the subject of many studies.  Atterhog (2005) classifies the 
advantages as those relating to (i) the dwelling itself – ownership dwellings are typically 
larger and of higher quality; (ii) accumulation of wealth as home ownership is often 
regarded as a long term investment; and (iii) the non-tangible benefits many of which 
constitute positive externalities for society and local community. Coulson (2002) 
describes three aspects of positive externalities from ownership that have been studied 
empirically.  These include (i) better maintenance of property (Harding, Miceli and 
Sirmans, 2000), (ii) being better citizens (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999), and (iii) 
children of owners having higher levels of cognition and fewer behavioral problems 
(Haurin, Parcel and Haurin, 2002).   These positive attributes are by no means universal.  
A study by Quigley and Raphael (2004) concludes that the evidence of externalities from 
homeownership is not overwhelming. 
With regard to negatives, homeownership is also associated with residential 
immobility, differentiation and fragmentation, and is increasingly viewed as more risky 
that in the past. Homeownership results in over-concentration of household investment in 
one asset as well as exposes the household to uncertainty from housing price and interest 
rate fluctuations (Atterhog, 2005).  Moreover, the benefits and problems of low-income 
homeownership differ from that of high income homeownership.  Shiller (2003) 
advocated creating insurance on market values of individual homes; recently, market 
initiatives to insure housing equity or hedge against price risk have been introduced in the 
UK and the USA (Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magne, 2003; de Jong, Driessen and Van 
Hemert, 2007).   
Not surprisingly, therefore, homeownership rates vary widely across countries as 
well as regionally within a country.  While Hungary, India, Mexico, Spain, Singapore, 
Greece and Italy have rates of 80% or more, high income countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland have rates below 45%.  UK, USA and Canada have homeownership rates in 
the 65% to 69% range (Proxenos, 2003).  Mass privatization of the housing sector in UK, 
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Eastern Europe and in China have also resulted in significant increases in homeownership 
rates over a short period of time.   
Recent studies that have tried to study the determinants of home ownership rates 
internationally include Fisher and Jaffe (2003), Earley (2004), Gwin and Ong (2004) and 
Atterhog (2005).   Using multivariate analysis of macro-level data from 106 countries, 
Fisher and Jaffe (2003) found that it was not possible to provide a single equation model 
for homeownership variations globally.  They concluded that legal, economic, political 
and cultural institutions matter more as compared to income, ethnicity and demographic 
variables.  The study by Gwin and Ong (2004) provides international evidence to support 
the theory that homeownership is sensitive to price of ownership relative to rental costs, 
and postulated that higher ownership rates in some countries could be attributed to 
government assistance programs and subsidies.   
Chiuri and Jappelli (2002), using microeconomic data on 14 OECD countries, 
find strong evidence that availability of mortgage finance (as measured by down payment 
ratios) affects home ownership rates across age groups, especially at the younger end.  
Proxenos (2003) however argues that homeownership rates alone are an incomplete 
measure of the quality of a country’s housing finance system and emphasizes the 
importance of government policy on homeownership.  Earley (2004) categorizes the 
various reasons for the wide variation in homeownership rates into factors on the supply 
side, demand side, transactions costs, government policies and cultural issues (p. 30).  
Atterhog (2005) surveyed housing researchers in 23 countries to collect information on 
government support for homeownership and concluded that ‘government incentives may 
matter for homeownership rates.’ 
Government policies favoring homeownership as a tenure choice are widespread 
and take various forms in different countries.   These include mortgage interest payments 
that are tax deductible, special treatment of capital gains from housing, tenant protection 
laws that negatively impact the value of investment properties, mass privatization, 
supply-side subsidies for state agencies and developers of housing for sale, mortgage 
interest subsidies, mandatory housing finance contributions, direct grants for housing 
purchase, property tax subsidies, planning laws, limitations on the supply of rental 
housing, etc. 
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In countries where homeownership is accorded policy attention, the affordability 
of homeownership is likely to be closely tracked.  In Section II, we review the literature 
on homeownership affordability indicators.  Section III analyses the market implications 
of setting a homeownership affordability target for a market segment by the government.   
In Section IV, we use Singapore as case study to test for the validity of the hypotheses 
derived in Section III.  Section V concludes. 
 
 
Indicators of housing affordability 
 Bogdon and Can (1997) provide a review of indicators of rental affordability.  
The share of income spent on housing or rental expenditure-to-income ratio is widely 
used, with 25 to 30 percent of income representing the upper limit of affordability 
(Hulchanski, 1995).  
For the majority of households in countries with high homeownership rates as 
well as for policy makers tracking homeownership affordability, housing affordability is 
about homeownership affordability.  Robinson, Scobie and Hallinan (2006) provide a 
comprehensive review of the concepts and measurement of housing affordability.  A 
variety of organizations monitor homeownership affordability using the following 
indicators: 
(i) House price to income ratio (UN-HABITAT); 
(ii) Mortgage payment to household income ratio (US National Association of 
Realtors); 
(iii) Ratio of median family income to the income required to qualify for a 
conventional mortgage on the median valued house sold (US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development). 
Rather than using income-based ability to pay as a benchmark, Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2003) advocate focusing on housing price relative to its fundamental costs of 
production as a measure of housing affordability.  Quigley and Raphael (2004) estimate 
the user cost of housing capital, with and without capital gains, as an indicator of the 
change in homeownership affordability over time.   Krainer and Wei (2004) advocate 
using the price-rent ratio as an indicator of market deviations from the fundamental value 
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of housing.  Gwin and Ong (2004) find international variations in homeownership rates to 
be highly sensitive to the price-to-rent ratio. 
Each of the above measures of affordability has its benefits and limitations.  The 
most widely used and cited indicator of homeownership affordability is the median house 
price to median income ratio, due to its simplicity and ease of understanding.  Its use is 
recommended by the World Bank and the United Nations; the ratio is available on the 
UN-HABITAT database and it is also tracked for 265 metropolitan markets in six 
countries by the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey (Performance 
Urban Planning, 2009).  Its shortcomings include its failure to include mortgage interest 
rates, banks’ lending practices such as loan to value ratios, capital gains, and amounts of 
taxes and repairs.  No one measure of affordability is adequate on it is own and Robinson 
et.al. (2006) advocate using a basket of measures to obtain a complete picture of 
affordability trends. 
 
 
Market implications of a house price to income ratio target 
In this section, we examine the market implications of setting a homeownership 
affordability target for a market segment by the government using a non-formal 
theoretical framework.   We then use the Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) formulation of the 
housing market to study the implications for housing demand and supply elasticities.  
Setting such a house price to income ratio would require the government to 
intervene in the housing market to determine prices paid by households in the targeted 
sector. Countries where forms of selective homeownership affordability targets and 
policies exist include Norway, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea (Aarland and 
Nordvik, 2009; Groves, et.al., 2007).  These and European countries such as the Sweden 
and the Netherlands (where the emphasis is more on affordable rental housing) have 
housing allocation policies and levels of housing market intervention that contrast with 
the market-oriented US housing model. 
The literature on the market impact of housing policies is rather thin.  As 
reviewed in Nordvik (2006), the literature on how selective housing programs affect 
housing market equilibrium outcomes include the analyses of Malpezzi and Vandell 
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(2002), Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) and Murray (1983, 1999) for the US, and Nordvik 
(1997, 2006) for Norway.  This article contributes to the existing literature by considering 
the market impacts of housing targets in an Asian context, and where the scale of 
intervention is at a much higher level than in market oriented housing models. 
Consider a housing market in which the household in a targeted group is not 
expected to pay more than x times the median household income for the median dwelling 
in the targeted group.  This policy may be achieved through supply side and/or demand 
side policies.  On the supply side, the government may choose to build or subsidize the 
building of housing that is sold to the targeted group at a price that is consistent with the 
price affordability target.  It could also subsidize the household through the use of 
housing grants the amount of which allows the household to purchase a housing unit at a 
price net of grant subsidy that is consistent with the price affordability target.  Here, we 
analyze the market implications of supply side housing programs. 
 Housing policy determines the desired ratio x*, the quality of the housing unit for 
the targeted group, as well as maximum income measure as a cut-off point to exclude 
higher income households from non-universal subsidized housing units (either an 
absolute income figure or say y*% of the area’s median income).  In the short term 
however, the actual x and y may differ from the target x* and y* due to policy lags and 
unexpected income shocks.  As discussed in Hulchanski (1995), housing affordability 
measures and income cut-offs used for the purpose of defining housing need for public 
policy purposes whether for rental or homeownership programs are ‘arbitrary’ and 
dependent ‘upon the values or beliefs of individuals’ (p. 489).  
 In the case of supply side programs, a public housing authority supplies 
subsidized housing where the price is based on a target x* times the median household 
income in the targeted group.  In the presence of resource constraints and a public 
housing budget that is insufficient to provide subsidies to all eligible applicants, the 
housing authority keeps a waiting list of households which have applied for housing 
benefits.  The length of the waiting list provides an important non-price signal to the 
housing authority to increase supply in order to maintain x*.  At the same time, in the 
presence of uncertain income shocks, the housing authority may not adjust house prices 
fast enough so that prevailing x may be greater or below target x*.    
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When the income shock is positive, ratio x < x*, the price difference between the 
price set by the housing authority and the market price increases.   If y* is set at a fairly 
inclusive level, there is an increase in housing demand in the targeted sector; the waiting 
list lengthens and this may cause the housing authority to increase housing starts.  When 
the income shock is negative, and there is no downward adjustment, the ratio x > x*, the 
waiting list shortens and the price difference between price set by the housing authority 
and the market price falls.  This may have the effect of causing the housing authority to 
cut back on its building program.  However, if the targeted sector is a small proportion of 
the population (y* is a low number), the number of beneficiaries decrease in good times 
as incomes rise above the income cut-off point. Conversely, demand increases in bad 
times as more households become eligible to benefit from the program.  Housing starts 
for the targeted sector in this framework respond to excess demand as reflected in the 
length of the waiting list, rather than directly to housing prices.  When x is not equal to 
x*, the length of the waiting list depends on the income cut-off point as well as on the 
magnitude of the deviation and this results in greater volatility in construction activity 
than the case when x is equal to x*.   
Policy decisions with regard to two policy variables, the income cut-off points 
and the quality of housing constructed by the housing authority therefore have 
implications for market outcomes.  Income shocks affect the proportion of the population 
available for housing subsidies when absolute income cut-offs points are `sticky’.   
Besides the price, subsidies per unit are determined by the quality of housing built and 
sold by the housing authority and the production (land and construction) costs incurred.  
 Using the above framework, in the presence of income uncertainty and resource 
constraints, the objective of house price affordability is achieved for the targeted 
household at the expense of greater volatility in residential construction activity.  When 
the size of the targeted sector is significant in size, there are spillover price volatility and 
crowding out effects on the non-targeted housing market segment.  This results in 
political pressures on the government to expand the housing affordability target to a 
larger proportion of the population.  
  The methodology applied to study the implications of a homeownership 
affordability target on housing market elasticities is the reduced form method used by 
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Malpezzi and Mayo (1997). It starts with a simple model of demand and supply and 
derives a reduced form equation for the equilibrium price. Since both the demand 
equation and the supply equation are assumed to be in double-log forms, the estimated 
coefficients of the income (Y) and the price (P) term in the demand equation become the 
income and price elasticities, α2 and α1, respectively. Likewise, the coefficient of the price 
term in the supply equation β1 represents the price elasticity of supply. As it can be shown 
below, the price elasticity of supply can be computed from the estimated coefficient of 
the equilibrium price equation once the values of the income and price elasticities of 
demand are given. 
QD =  α0 + α1 Ph + α2 Y + α3 D 
QS =  β 0 + β1 Ph  
QD =  QS  
QD is the log quantity of housing demanded, QS is the log quantity of housing supplied, 
Ph is the log of the relative price per unit of housing, Y is the log of income, and D is the 
log of population. 
 The reduced form of the system can be found by equating demand and supply and 
solving for Ph, the price of housing. 
   Ph =   α0 - β0   +    α2  Y  +    α3  D     
            β1 - α1       β1 - α1       β1 - α1
 
Making the reduced form stochastic,  
Ph = γ0 + γ1 Y + γ2 D + ε 
 
The price elasticity of housing supply is estimated as 
 β1 =   α2   +  α1 
                      γ1 
where γ1 is the estimated elasticity of housing price with respect to income, and the 
parameters α1, the price elasticity of housing demand and α2, the income elasticity of 
demand.  
We ask the following question: what are the implications in the above model of a 
house price to income ratio target x* that is held constant despite changes in income and 
population?  For a constant quality housing bundle, we obtain  
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Ph – Y = log (x*)  
Ph   = log (x*) + Y 
Comparing it with the reduced form stochastic,  
Ph = γ0 + γ1 Y + γ2 D + ε 
we expect a housing market with a house price to income ratio target to exhibit the 
following values for γ1 and γ2:  γ1  is equal to one; and γ2 is equal to zero.  Since the price 
elasticity of housing supply is estimated as 
 β1 =   α2   +  α1 
                      γ1 
 
and γ1  is equal to one,  β1 =   α2   +  α1. 
i.e., the price elasticity of housing supply is equal to the sum of the price elasticity and 
the income elasticity of demand for housing.  Since both α2 and α1 have been found from 
empirical studies to be less than one, we expect estimates of price elasticity of housing 
supply in price regulated markets to be relatively inelastic.  
From the above general theoretical discussion, we extract some hypotheses 
concerning a regulated housing market where there exists a homeownership affordability 
target that is successfully implemented: 
(i) There is crowding out of the non-targeted sector and the size of the targeted 
housing sector tends to expand over time. 
(ii) Housing affordability tends to be fairly constant across income groups and 
over time. 
(iii) There is greater housing consumption equity than would exist in a market 
oriented housing economy.   Given constant house price to income ratio 
targets, the income elasticity of demand for housing consumption is less than 
one. 
(iv) New construction of public housing is more sensitive to the length of the 
waiting list rather than house prices.  Housing supply is relatively price 
inelastic.  
(v) House price changes are less dependent on population growth rates and 
construction costs than in a market-oriented housing model. 
 8
The above hypotheses regarding the implication of setting a homeownership affordability 
target can be subjected to testing in regulated housing markets with such a target.   In the 
next section, we consider the case for the Singapore housing market. 
 
Singapore as a case study 
Singapore is a densely populated high-income city-state with 4.84 million people and 
a land area of only 700 square kilometers.   Of the 4.84 million people in 2008, 3.16 
million were citizens, 0.48 million were permanent residents, and 1.20 million were 
foreigners. Its Gross Domestic Product in 2007 was S$243 billion; the GDP per capita 
was S$52,994 or US$35,163 (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry website at 
www.mti.gov.sg ).      
The Singapore government has a long record of extensive intervention in the 
housing sector to ensure homeownership affordability and adequate supply of housing - a 
subsidized homeownership scheme was introduced in 1964.  As a direct result of policy 
interventions and supply of affordable flats, the homeownership rate for resident 
Singaporeans exceeds 90 percent.  An estimated 86 percent of the resident population 
reside in over 900,000 apartments in estates built by the Housing and Development Board 
(HDB) – locally referred to as public housing although 95% of the units are owned by 
their occupants on leasehold basis (a new unit has a leasehold of 99 years).  The median 
house type in Singapore is the 4-room HDB flat which is about 90 sq m (see generally, 
Phang, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2007). 
On the demand side, housing finance availability was supported through the 
channeling of compulsory savings to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) for housing down 
payments and monthly mortgage payments (see Phang, 2001, 2007 and Yuen, 2002 for 
detailed analysis of the mortgage finance system in Singapore).  The HDB provides 30 
year mortgages for its homeownership flats, charging an interest rate of 0.1 percent above 
the rate paid on CPF savings.  The dominance of the state in the housing sector has been 
aided by an array of instruments on the supply side.  These include land use planning, 
land acquisition by the state, government direct provision of housing, government sale of 
sites for private housing, as well as density controls and redevelopment regulation.  
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The state owns about 90 percent of all land today, up from about 44 percent in 
1960 (Han, 2005).  This dramatic increase in the state’s landholdings was effected via 
land reclamation (reclaimed land automatically becomes state land) and most 
importantly, eminent domain provisions that made it easy and cheap in the past for the 
state to reacquire privately held land for development purposes.  State ownership and 
control of land were considered essential to building industrial estates to attract multi-
national corporations to invest in Singapore and building public housing on a large scale.  
Singapore’s public land leasing system for private housing has played a secondary role to 
its public housing program which dominates the housing sector in terms of stock and 
annual supply.  At present, 80% of the housing stock in Singapore has been developed by 
the public sector.   
The history of the growth of the public sector dominance is consistent with 
hypothesis (i) that there is crowding out of the non-targeted sector and that the size of the 
targeted housing sector tends to expand over time. Table 1 shows various indicators of 
growth in the targeted sector, viz., increases in income cut-off points over a 35 year 
period from 1970 to 2005, and increasing share of resident population residing in the 
HDB sector which peaked at 87% in 1985.  Table 2 shows that the variance of the private 
housing price index increased significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s.  While other 
factors also drive house price changes, studies by Phang and Wong (1996), Tu and Wong 
(2002) have shown that price changes in the resale HDB and private housing market were 
significantly affected by various housing policies. 
As another indication of the expansion of the targeted sector, housing schemes for 
the group excluded by HDB income cut-offs include:  
(a) housing developed by the Housing and Urban Development Company (income 
ceiling of $4000 from 1974 and $6000 from 1985) which was discontinued in the 
later half of the 1980s; and 
(b) the Executive Condominiums (EC) Scheme which was initiated in 1997.  These are 
classified as private housing but with a monthly household income cut-off point of 
S$10,000; purchasers face many of the restrictions such as minimum occupancy 
period that apply to HDB homeowners.  The government tenders state land on 99 
year leasehold basis for the development of EC units to housing developers (private 
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as well as government-linked companies) who are responsible for design, 
construction, pricing, arrangements for financing and estate management.    
Table 3 shows the 2008 house price to income ratio as well as debt service ratios for 
different flat sizes sold by the HDB.  In addition to the subsidized price, since 2006, 
eligible households are entitled to additional housing grants which are based on 
household incomes.  This lowers housing price to income ratios further for the lower 
income groups.  As shown in Table 3, the house price to income ratio increases with flat 
size and is 4.6 and below for the majority of applicants (4 room and smaller flats).  The 
debt-service ratio (DSR) is fairly constant across flat types (18% to 24%) and averages 
21%, evidence that housing prices are determined based on incomes of the targeted 
groups and housing expenditure to income is fairly constant across the targeted income 
groups.  
According to the Minister for National Development, “We monitor affordability by 
how much a flat buyer has to pay out of his monthly household income to service his 
mortgage payments…. The DSR for almost all flat types was lower than 23%.  Why 
23%? Because 23% is the monthly CPF contribution that can be used for housing 
mortgages.  This means that the loan can be serviced entirely by their monthly CPF 
contributions.  In other words, they need not fork out any cash to own their homes” (Mah, 
2009, paragraphs 5 and 6).  
 Table 4 shows the variation in house price to income ratio over the past decade 
for a new HDB 4-room flat and using the median household income from work for 
resident households.   The ratio shows a marked increase in the latter half of the 1990s 
with prices adjusting upwards with the housing boom and with increases being 
maintained during the post-Asian financial crisis period which saw significant market 
price declines (see Figure 1). The ratio was fairly stable in the economic recovery period 
2000 to 2005 and ranged from 3.8 to 4.1.  In 2006, as the housing market recovered, there 
were increases in new flat prices even as a new system of additional housing grants 
(ranging from S$5,000 to S$20,000 per eligible household) that were based on household 
income were introduced.   
Figure 1 shows trends for GDP per capita and three house price indices for 
Singapore: new HDB, resale HDB, and private housing. To simplify comparison, the 
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indices have been adjusted such that they all have a value of 100 in 1993.  It is apparent 
that the HDB chose not to follow market trends and adjust new flat prices downwards in 
line with income falls in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.  This caused new 
HDB flats to be less affordable -- the number of applicants for new flats fell to 22,000 in 
June 2001 from its peak of 146,000 in 1997.  Many households dropped out of the queue 
and the HDB was left with a surplus stock of about 20,000 unsold flats in the late 1990s 
(The Straits Times, 15 September 2001, 10 January 2002, and 20 September 2009).  
However, the policy to maintain new flat prices, which resulted in the large stock of 
unsold units which was cleared only in 2007, helped mitigate house price declines (The 
Straits Times, 20 September 2009). In 2002, the HDB suspended its queuing system, 
diverting remaining and new applicants to its project specific Built-to-Order program 
under which a project is commenced only when there is sufficient demand for units.  
Table 5 shows the housing space consumption differences in Singapore as 
compared to the income gap.  There is greater housing consumption equity than would 
exist in a market oriented housing economy.  While the ratio of median household 
income of applicants for 5-room flats to 3-room flats is 2.57, the ratio of living space is 
1.69.  Based on the limited data on flat size and median household income data in Table 
5, rough estimates of income elasticity of housing demand are less than one and these are 
consistent with estimates for other countries.  Although household data would have 
provided more rigorous and precise estimates, the data is unavailable.  
The increasing average price per sq m for larger flat types (from $1,956 to $3,082 
per square meter for similar housing type) is an indication that the administered price of 
each flat type is based on factors other than development costs.  The HDB has clarified 
that it determines the prices of its flats by “first looking at the recently transacted prices 
of resale units nearby.  Adjustments are then made to account for factors like location, 
finishes of the flat and other attributes.  The price reflects the flat’s value at the point of 
purchase and is what people are willing to pay on the open market for such a unit.  The 
HDB then sells it at a significant discount, which is the subsidy given by the 
Government” (The Straits Times, 20 September 2009, p.8).   
The HDB tracks the number of applications for its housing programs closely and 
its building program is responsive to demand (as stated by the Minister for National 
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Development, The Straits Times, 15 September 2009). We would therefore expect supply 
of public housing to be relatively price inelastic.   Table 6 shows the price elasticity of 
supply estimates using the Malpezzi-Mayo reduced form estimation method for the resale 
HDB price series and the private housing price series.  The income coefficient for the 
HDB sector, where affordability is tracked closely, is close to one.  From the literature on 
housing elasticites (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987; Malpezzi and Maclennan, 2001), we 
assume the range of income elasticity of housing demand to be between 0.50 and 0.75, 
and price elasticity of housing demand to be between -0.3 and -0.5.  Based on these 
values, reasonable estimates of price elasticity of supply for the HDB sector lie in the 
zero to 0.45 range; for the private housing sector (converting negative values to zero) the 
range of estimates lies between zero and 0.11.    
As expected, the coefficient of the population coefficient is not significant for 
both resale HDB and private housing.  This is consistent with hypothesis (v) concerning 
housing systems with homeownership affordability targets.  In a study of Singapore’s 
private housing market, Tu (2004) found that building material cost indexes and prime 
lending rates were also not significant variables in the supply model.  She suggested that 
the “building material cost indexes reflect the building material costs for both public and 
private housing construction. Importing low-cost building materials has been the method 
used by Singapore’s public housing provider to control the construction costs of public 
housing.  Hence, the building material cost indexes are not an adequate indicator for the 
cost of private housing construction” (Tu 2004, p. 617).  An alternative explanation 
offered here is that in a housing model with a targeted homeownership affordability ratio, 
housing prices and construction activity are policy driven and determined by other 
variables rather than costs.   
 
Conclusion 
There is a large literature on affordable housing and housing policy.  This paper adds 
to the literature by analyzing the implications of setting homeownership affordability 
targets in the context of a targeted housing segment.  The analyses suggest a number of 
market implications of such regulation as compared to a market oriented housing model.  
These include expansion of the targeted housing sector over time, the relative constancy 
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of actual housing price to income ratios for households in the targeted sector, greater 
housing space consumption equity, income inelastic housing demand, price inelastic 
housing supply, as well as house price changes that are relatively less driven by 
population growth rates and construction costs.   
While the experience and data for Singapore were found to support the above 
hypotheses, it is neither possible nor desirable to make generalizations based on 
Singapore’s rather unique housing experience.  The expansion of the targeted housing 
sector requires appropriate political and financial support.  This political support and 
appropriate financial regime that facilitated expansion in resources to the program are 
evident in Singapore and reflect the specific evolution of its housing policy.   
Similar homeownership policies have been designed and followed by countries which 
have emphasized housing welfare and explicitly aim for increased homeownership rates 
such as Norway, Hong Kong, South Korea, and the UK. A targeted affordable housing 
policy, adopted under different fiscal and monetary constraints, would not necessarily 
have outcomes similar to Singapore. How the experiences of these countries relate to the 
findings presented here constitute potential areas for further comparative research.  
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Table 1    Expansion of targeted sectors for eligibility of housing subsidy 
 
 
 
Year 
Income ceiling cut-
off for HDB 
Homeownership 
Flats 
% of resident 
population residing 
in HDB sector 
Homeownership 
rate for resident 
households  
1970 $1200 (1970) 35% 29% 
1980 $2500 (1979) 81% 59% 
1990 $5000 (1989) 86% 88% 
2000 $8000 (1994) 83% 92% 
2005 $8000 (1994) 82% 91% 
Source: HDB Annual Reports. 
 
 
Table 2 Variance in private housing price index 
 
Decade Variance 
1979-1988 122 
1989-1998 2200 
1999-2008 395 
 
 
 
Table 3 House price to income and debt-service ratios (DSR), 2008 
 
HDB flat 
type 
Average 
price* 
Flat 
size in 
square 
metres+
Average 
price 
per sq 
m 
Median 
income of 
applicants* 
House 
price to 
income 
ratio# 
Debt-
service 
ratio* 
2-room $88,000 45 $1,956 $1,280 5.7 (3.1) 18% 
3-room $146,000 65 $2,246 $2,100 5.8 (4.6) 24% 
4-room $251,000 90 $2,789 $4,350 4.8 (4.6) 21% 
5-room $339,000 110 $3,082 $5,400 5.2 23% 
   Average 21% 
 
Note: # the house price to income ratios in brackets take into account the Additional CPF 
Housing Grants which varies with household incomes.  We assume the grant to be 
S$40,000 for 2-room flat applicants, S$30,000 for 3-room flat applicants and S$10,000 
for 4-room flat applicants.  
 
Sources: +HDB Annual Report; * figures from Mah (2009). 
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Table 4 Estimated House Price to Income Ratio for 
4-room flat purchased directly from the HDB 
 
Year Price of 4 
room HDB 
flat+ 
Monthly 
household 
income* 
House price 
to income 
ratio 
1995 $135,830 $3,135 3.6 
1997 $173,548 $3,617 4.0 
1998 $182,450 $3,692 4.1 
1999 $179,945 $3,500 4.3 
2000 $176,100 $3,640 4.0 
2001 $175,463 $3,860 3.8 
2002 $167,511 $3,630 3.8 
2003 $169,476 $3,600 3.9 
2004 $177,790 $3,690 4.0 
2005 $187,860 $3,860 4.1 
2006 $215,643 $4,000 4.5 
2007 $214,016 $4,380 4.1 
2008 $251,000 $4,950 4.2 
Notes: 
+ Based on author’s hedonic housing price regression estimation with flat type and 
location dummies using price data for new flats from HDB Annual Reports. 
*Refers to monthly median household income from work for resident households; data 
for 1996 income is not available. 
 
Source: Income data from Singapore Department of Statistics, Key Household Income 
Trends, 2008, January 2009. 
 
 
Table 5 Housing space consumption gaps versus income gap 2008 
 
HDB flat type Flat size in 
sq m 
Average price 
per sq m 
Median monthly 
household income of 
applicants 
2-room 45 $1,956 $1,280 
3-room 65 $2,246 $2,100 
4-room 90 $2,789 $4,350 
5-room 110 $3,082 $5,400 
5 to 3-rm ratio 1.69 1.37 2.57 
5 to 2-rm ratio 2.44 1.58 4.22 
 
Source: As for Table 3. 
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Table 6  
Estimates of price elasticity of housing supply 
 
 
 
 
Price series 
 
 
Income 
coefficient 
γ1 
 
 
 
Population 
coefficient 
Estimates of price elasticity 
of housing supply β1
            β1 =   α2 / γ1  +  α1 
 
Income elasticity α2
       α2 = 0.5                  α2 = 0.75 
Resale HDB 
1990-2008 annual 
R-square = 0.625 
 
 
0.9985 
(1.14) 
 
0.8446 
(0.67) 
 
0.00 (α1 = -0.5) 
0.20 (α1 = -0.3) 
 
0.25 (α1 = -0.5) 
0.45 (α1 = -0.3) 
 
Private Housing 
1975-2008 annual 
R-square = 0.880 
 
 
1.8183 
(4.58) 
 
-1.1749 
(-1.46) 
 
-0.23 (α1 = -0.5) 
-0.03 (α1 = -0.3) 
 
-0.09 (α1 = -0.5) 
 0.11 (α1 = -0.3) 
 
Notes: 
1. income series used is nominal per capita GDP, price series are nominal as well 
2. figures in brackets below coefficient estimates denote t-statistics 
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Figure 1 Trends for nominal per capita income and housing price indices 
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Sources: Indexes (1993=100) computed from data available on the websites of Singapore 
Department of Statistics (income series), Housing and Development Board, Singapore 
(Resale HDB Price Index), and Urban Redevelopment Authority, Singapore (Private 
Housing Price Index).  The New HDB Price Index is based on author’s hedonic housing 
price regression estimation with location and flat type dummies using price data for new 
flats found in the HDB’s Annual Reports.   
 
 22
